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MENTAL PROPOSITIONS
Paloma PÉREZ-ILZARBE
Universidad de Navarra
Pardo's views on mental language reflect an advanced status of the
discussions on this issue. Almost two centuries have passed since Ock-
ham's innovative theses were delivered, and since the reactions of his
contemporaries which followed1. Given this distance from the original
controversy, Pardo does not address the problem of mental language as
an independen! one, but rather he uses the notion of a mental language
(which he takes for granted) when he needs it, either to solve some logical
difficulty or to substantiate some of his semantic theses.
Pardo's logical work (Medulla Dyalectices: París, 1500, 1505) is con-
structed around a core issue, namely, the problem of truth. All his analy-
ses are directed to finding out what it is that truth and falsity depend on.
In this approach, propositions (and also mental propositions) become the
focus of the majority of Pardo's reflections. I have chosen the question
of the unity of mental propositions, because it is extensively treated by
Pardo, so that the detailed discussion allows him to bring into play his
whole theory of language and thought.
On the surface, the question "an propositio mentalis sit plures noticie"
arises as a help to solve a technical difficulty: the problem raised by a
sophism, namely, the apparent conflict concerning truth valúes, caused
by the fact that utterances have parts that can be arranged in different
ways ("Omnis homo est homo" / "Homo omnis homo est"). But at a
deeper and more interesting level, the question about the composition of
1 See G. Nuchelmans, Late Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition,
Amsterdam-Oxford-New York North Holland, 1980; E. J. Ashworth, "Mental Language
and the Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century
Logicians", Franciscan Studies 41 (1981), p. 61-96; ead., "The Structure of Mental Lan-
guage: Some Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians", Vivarium 20
(1982), p. 59-83. Also, a brilliant analysis of the development of the discussions up to
the seventeenth century can be found in S. Meier-Oeser, "Mental Language and Mental
Representations in Late Scholastic Logic", in R. L. Friedman and S. Ebbesen (eds.), John
Buridan andBeyond. Topics in the Language Sciences J 300-1700, Copenhagen, The Roy al
Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 2004, p. 237-265.
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mental propositions helps us to understand what exactly a proposition is:
what, if there is such a thing, makes the proposition something different
from other pieces of language.
Preliminaries: propositions and their meaning
What is a proposition ?
If we search the Medulla looking for a definition of propositio, we do
not find any. All we have are some lines explaining the supposition of
the term "propositio (mentalis)":
Iste terminus 'propositio mentalis' supponit pro una qualitate existente in
anima, connotando talem qualitatem representare ita esse vel non esse2.
This analysis is quite illuminating, as it makes ciear that a proposi-
tion is specifically linked to a special kind of representare, In contras!
to the initial reading of the sophism, which focuses on the constituents
of the proposition, Pardo's ideas suggest that in order to understand
what a proposition is we must not look at it as an object, but rather as
a sign3.
Thus, in order to understand Pardo's answer to the question "an prop-
ositio mentalis sit plures noticie", it is worth explaining this special
kind of significare that is characteristic of propositions. Moreover,
in order to understand this special kind of signifying, we need to say
something about Pardo's ontology and his ideas about the signifícate of
propositions.
The signifícate of a proposition
The problem of the significatum propositionis is addressed by Pardo
at the very beginning of his work. He presents his own ideas as an inter-
mediate solution between two paradigmatic conceptions: the theory of
2 Medulla Dyalectices, París, 1505, f. 7va,
3 The consideration of the proposition as a sign explains, in addition, the priority that
Pardo gives to mental propositions over vocal and written ones, as they cannot signify
unless they are subordinated to a mental proposition: "Dico enim quod si non habeatur
actualiter mentalis propositio correspondens propositioni vocali, tune propositio vocalis
non est vera ñeque falsa, ymo non est propositio, quia non signifícat, nunquam enim
aliquid significat nisi actualiter habeatur noticia de illo quod significatur" (Medulla
Dyalectices, f. 7rb).
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complexe significabile as defended by Gregory of Rimini, on the one hand
(which postúlales a special kind of entity designed to be the signifícate
of propositions)4, and the theory put forward by John Buridan, on the
other hand (which reduces the signifícate of a proposition to the particu-
lar things signified by the terms)5. Pardo's solution is an original middle
term. In fact, although his nominalism makes him sympathise with Bur-
idan's ideas, they must be (radically) transformed in order to achieve the
project that Pardo has in mind: he wants to ground truth and falsity on
the signifícate of propositions, and the Buridanian "bare particulars" are
not enough to carry out this task.
In addition to this semantic perspective, there is an epistemológica!
motivation for Pardo's proposa]: as he makes a literal reading of the
phrase "intellectus movetur a re", and as he observes that the same
things can be conceived in a multiplicity of ways, thus he is convinced
that there must be some different ways for the same things to be arranged
in reality (these ways functioning as the cause that moves the intellect to
form the different ways of conceiving things). This is the extra element
that Pardo adds to the Buridanian view: the particular things signified by
simple terms are related in different ways, and these "ways of being
related" (modus se habendi) function as the cause that moves the intel-
lect to conceive the same particular things in so many different ways. For
example, the intellect can conceive things affirmatively by means of an
affirmative proposition. Therefore, if the intellectual act must be strictly
caused by reality, there must be in reality an affirmative way of being
related.
This is how Pardo's semantic views forcé him to adopt an enriched
ontology. In Pardo's world, in addition to the particular things (individual
men and animáis, for example), "there are" also some ways of being
related (modus se habendi, which correspond to the different ways of being
conceived: affirmatively, negatively, disjunctively, universally...), and
even some relative modalities (modalitates relativae, which correspond
to the different modes of these relationships: truly, falsely, necessarily,
and so on)6. To the question about the signifícate of propositions, Pardo
answers in a Buridanian manner (identifying it with the particular things
signified by the terms), but he qualifies this view from the perspective of
his enriched ontology (as the signifícate of a proposition is not reduced
4 Ibid., if, lr-2v.
5 Ibid., ff. 2v-5r
6 Ibid., ff. 5r-7r
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to the "bare particulars" signified by the terms, but is identified with
these particulars insofar as they are related in an affirmative or negative
way)7.
Of course, the nominalist Pardo always insists that these (infinitely
many) "modes of being related" are not really (non realitef) different
from the related things themselves. But eventually he cannot avoid rec-
ognising that there is some difference between the particular things and
the modes of being that cause the different modes of conceiving them:
Sócrates, for example (which is conceived by the term "Sócrates"), can-
not be exactly the same as Sócrates insofar as he is idéntica! with himself
(which is conceived by the proposition "Sócrates is Sócrates"): if they
were the same, it would be impossible to know Sócrates without know-
ing that Sócrates is Sócrates, which is denied by Pardo8.
The signification of a proposition
In accordance with these ideas about the signifícate of propositions,
Pardo recognises a specific signification for propositions (a specific way
of signifying), that distinguishes them from terms. A proposition, although
it signifies the same things as its terms signify separately, signifies them
in a way that cannot be signified by the simple terms. In order to under-
stand this "way of signifying" (parallel to the ontological "modes of
being related"), it is worth considering Pardo's ideas about syncate-
gorematic terms.
7 See G. Nuchelmans, op. cit., p. 65-66; E. J. Ashworth, "Mental Language and the
Unity of Propositions", p, 69; P. Pérez-Ilzarbe, "John Blindan and Jerónimo Pardo on the
Notion of Proposition", in R. L. Friedman and S. Ebbesen (eds.), John Enrielan and
Beyond..., p. 153-18], esp. p. 167-172.
8 "Sed ibi esset bonum dubium: utrum noticia illius rnodi se habendi sufficienter
causetur a noticia rei que sic se habet. Respondeo: ad cognoscendum aliquem modum se
habendi necesse est habere noticias omnium eorum vel cuiuslibet quod exigitur ad talem
modum se habendi. Sed lamen hec consequentia non valet: 'cognosco quicquid exigitur
ad aliqua taliter se habere, ergo cognosco illa taliter se habere'; nam clarum est quod
ad hoc quod Sortes se habeat unitive affirmative ad seipsum non requiritur nisi Sortes,
et lamen non sequitur 'cognosco Sortem, ergo cognosco Sortem unitive in ordine ad
seipsum', nam per noticiam cui subordinatur iste terminus 'Sortem' cognosco Sortem et
lamen non cognosco Sortem unitive in ordine ad seipsum. Et ex hoc videtur apparenlia
quedam: quod Ule modus se habendi unitive non omnino ydemptificetur cum Sorle, ex eo
quod stat aliquem cognoscere Sortem et lamen non cognoscil quod Sones se habeal uni-
tive in ordine ad seipsum. Et istud argumentum posset applicari universaliter de ómnibus
modis se habendi unius ad aliud, probando esse aliquam distinctionem Ínter rem et modum
se habendi, sed hoc omitió quia non esl presenlis inquisitionis" (Medulla Dyalectices,
f, 17ra).
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Pardo offers an extensive analysis of "mental syncategorems" (or better,
of actus illis quibus suboráinantur sincathegoreumata vocalia vel scripta),
and presents a view which strongly diverges from the opinio communis9.
Opposing the view according to which mental syncategorems do not
signify aliquid, but only aliqualiter, Pardo defends the idea that any syn-
categorematic act signifies aliquid aliqualiter, That is, a syncategorem
signifies the same things that are signified by the categorematic terms,
but it signifies them in a way that the categorematic terms are not able
to signify10.
For Pardo, then, syncategorematic acts are true cognitions (notitia),
by means of which the intellect knows something11. The fact is that
the intellect can know the same thing in many different ways, so there
are many kinds of notitiae, by means of which the intellect knows the
things in different ways, For example, Sócrates can be known by a sim-
ple concept ("Sócrates"), but also by a mental proposition ("Sócrates est
Sócrates"), which represents the same thing in a different way (namely,
as affirmatively related to himself), and also Sócrates can be known by
a complex term ("Sócrates si est Sócrates", which represents him in a
conditional way with respect to himself), etc12.
9 Ibid., ff. llvb-14rb. See G. Nuchelmans, op. cit., p. 29-31; E. J. Ashworth, "The
Struciure of Menial Language", p. 63-65, wiih Ihe reaclions of Pardo's contemperarles to
his striking Iheses.
10 "Dico ergo quod huius condilionis sunl actus illi quibus subordinanlur sincate-
goreumata vocalia vel scripta: quod significan! aliquid, puta illud quod significant cathe-
goreumata, sed aliqualiler, taliter videlicet qualiter non significalur per cathegoreumata"
(Medulla Dyalectices, f. 12vb).
1' Pardo puts forward three objections, and gives ihe corresponding detailed answers,
in order to clarify the kind of signification ihal belongs to syncategorems: "significare
aliqua aliqualiter, representare aliqua aliqualiter" (Ibid., ff. 13ra-14rb).
12 "Et si queras quales ergo nolicie aul cuius condilionis sunl ille quibus subordinantur
sincathegoreumala vocalia aul scripla, respondeo intellectui noslro lanía esl dala intelli-
gendo fecundilas ab ipso summo opifice Deo ul quamcunque rem in numeris el infinitis
modis cognoscere potesl, ul islam rem que esl Sorles inlellectus infinilis diversis modis
cognoscendi cognoscere polesl. Poiesl enim [cognoscere] per noliciam simplicem el
incomplexarn cognoscere Sortem. Polesl cognoscere eliam per menlalem cui subordinatur
ista vocalis 'Sones esl Sortes', per illam enim menlalem 'Sortes est Sortes' nichil a Sorte
realiter dislinclum significalur, sed aliqualiter representatur qualiler non represenlalur
per illam noliciam Sorlis (scilicel, compositivo el unilive); el lali modo non represenlalur
per primean noliciam, el isla secunda nolicia compositiva el unitiva a prima noticia
causaiur, cum ipso intellectu principaliter effeclive concurrente. Potest etiam cognoscere
per islam menlalem 'Sorles non esl Sorles', sed aliler (pula, unitive negalive). Polesl
etiam cognoscere Sortem per hanc disiunctivam 'Sortes est Sortes vel Sortes non esl
Sorles' aliqualiter qualiler non concipil per illum lerminum Sortes (scilicel, disiunclive)"
(Ibid., f. 12va-b).
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The signification of a proposition is, of course, of a "syncategorematic"
nature: a proposition signifies the same things that are signified by sub-
ject and predicate, but in a special way (affirmatively, negatively, etc.)
wich corresponds to the different modes of ita esse vel non esse.
This special syncategorematic signification of propositions is the key to
understand the difference between a proposition and a term (for example,
"Homo est animal" signifies man and animal, but in a way that "homo"
and "animal" by themselves are not able to signify, that is, in so far as
they are affirmatively related). But in addition, this special way of signify-
ing is what allows Pardo to account for the unity of mental propositions.
The unity of mental propositions
It is important to note that Pardo's conception about the unity of mental
propositions has nothing to do with the question about the "glue" that joins
subject and predicate together. The "unity" of a mental proposition means
for Pardo the non-cornposite character of this mental act. Pardo's answer
to the question "an propositio mentalis sit plures notitie" is an emphatic
"no mental ultímate proposition (whether categorical or hypothetical or
any other) is composed as an aggregate of several cognitions"13.
In the subsequent discussion of this general thesis, Pardo develops a ftill
theory on the nature of mental propositions. I will focus on four aspects
of this theory, which Pardo defends as his most original points: first, the
place of judgement in Pardo's acount of the unity of propositions; second,
the sense of the "complexity" which is traditionally ascribed to proposi-
tions; then, the role that is left to subject and predicate in this account; and,
finally, the new conception of the copula which is advocated by Pardo.
Mental propositions and judgement
First of all, Pardo does not share Gregory of Rimini's view which
grants the unity of mental propositions by identifying them with simple
acts of judging (assensus or dissensus)1*.
13 "Mulla propositio mentalis ultímala (sive cathegorica, sive ypothetica, aut cuius-
cunque generis propositionum) est ex pluribus noticiis composita, compositione per aggre-
gationem, quod est dicere quod milla talis est plures noticie" (Ibid,, f. Uva). In order to
prove this thesis, Pardo presents four rallones that show the shortcomings of the opposed
view (Ibid., ff. 14va-15va).
14 lbid.,fi. 15vb-16r.
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For Pardo, the unity of a proposition is something previous to the act
of assenting or dissenting. This idea is connected to Pardo's conviction
about the priority of mental propositions over vocal and written ones. In
order for a vocal or written proposition to signify, it must be subordinated
to a mental one. But it is obvious that one does not need to make a judge-
ment in order to understand a vocal or written proposition. Using a famil-
iar example (the vocal proposition "Rex sedet"), Pardo explains that it
is perfectly possible that, in the lack of any reason for neither assenting
ñor dissenting to its contení, one does not form any mental judicative
proposition; nevertheless, if the vocal proposition is understood, one must
have formed some mental proposition, that must therefore be an appre-
hensive cognition (notitia apprehensiva^5,
Moreover, in order to form a judicative cognition, it is necessary to
have formed a previous apprehensive cognition, for it is impossible to
judge about a contení (the object of the judicative act) unless there is an
apprehension of this contení. Some might say then thal the judicative
cognition is at the same time an apprehensive cognition of its contení, but
Pardo has shown that there must be an apprehensive cognition distinct
from the judicative one, so he is entitled lo pul a previous apprehensive
cogniton as a requirement for ihe formalion of any acl of judgmenl.
In olher words, a judicalive proposition presupposes the modum repre-
sentandi of an apprehensive proposition15. And, even more, the mental
15 "Ideo, doctor ille recle ponit omnem mentalem esse simplicem noticiarn, ponendo
solam noticiarn iudicativam esse propositionem mentalem ultimatam. Sed hoc tamen non
credo esse verum, ad quod moveor tali ratione: quia satis possibile est aliquem habere
mentalem ultimatam et tamen non assentire aut dissentire. Nam proponatur alicui ista
propositio 'Rex sedet': manifestum est eum formare mentalem ultimatam qua cognoscit
regem sedere, quia aliter illa oratio vocalis ei non magis significare! quam greco litteras
latinas ignoranti, et tamen manifestum est eum non assentire aut dissentire huic quod est
regem sedere, quia non habet aliquod motivum, ut suppono, ad assentiendum vel dissen-
tiendum" (Ibid., f. lora).
16 "His suppositis, ad instantiam respondeo quod non sola noticia indicativa est
propositio mentalis, sed ponenda est quedam noticia apprehensiva a noticia iudicativa
realiter distincta, que prius (saltera natura) tendit in obiectum illud quod debet iudicari
per noticiarn iudicativam quam formetur noticia iudicativa realiter distincta. Et hoc
provenit ex perfectione quam habet noticia iudicativa, propter quam perfectionem pre-
supponit modum representandi noticie apprehensive. Unde dico quod illa qualitas que
est noticia iudicativa non esset noticia iudicativa sui obiecti nisi per apprehensivam
apprehendatur tale obiectum. Ideo, potest concedí quod noticia iudicativa quantum
ad illam denominationem que est iudicativa dependet ab apprehensiva, licet quídam
dixerunt quod ipsamet iudicativa est apprehensiva. Quamvis hoc posset sustineri, tamen
postquam est necesse poneré aliquam apprehensivam a iudicativa realiter distinctam,
melius est poneré apprehensivam illam presuppositam ad hoc quod habeatur noticia
iudicativa" (Ibid.,f. 16rb).
y-
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proposition properly speaking is just the apprehensive one. Assensus and
dissensus are only called "propositions" in a derivative sense, insofar as
they can be said truc or false17.
In conclusión, the act of judgement, which is essential to Gregory's
account of the unity of mental propositions, does not play any role in
Pardo's explanation. Instead, his efforts are directed towards making
clear how an apprehension that we usually cali "compositionem vel divi-
sionem" is nevertheless as simple as the "simplex apprehensio" itself.
Mental propositions and complexity
So the big challenge that Pardo has to face is the apparent conflict
between the thesis about the unity of mental propositions and the tradi-
tional view of propositions as a kind of complex18. On the one hand, he
is strongly interested in preserving this complexity, as he wants to use it
to draw the desired distinction between propositions and terms. But, on
the other hand, he has to créate a new notion of complexity, that would
not involve any danger to the simplicity of mental propositions19.
Pardo explicitly rejects the common view, according to which two
kinds of complexity can be distinguished: in genere reí and in genere
signi. This common view attributes to the propositions a complexity in
genere signi, which is explained as an equivalence in meaning to several
simple cognitions20. Now, Pardo objects that the proposition "Sócrates
est Sócrates" is not equivalen! in meaning to several cognitions. Instead,
this mental proposition is a noticia by which the same thing is known as
is known by the single noticia "Sócrates", although it is signified in a
new way, namely in a unitive way (as related to himself)21.
17 "Et si queras que istarum noticiarum, iudicativa videlicet an apprehensiva, dicatur
propositio illa cui subordinatur propositio vocalis in significando, respondeo: de noticia
apprehensiva solet teneri communiter quod est propositio mentalis cui subordinatur voca-
lis, sed de noticia iudicativa non modo dubium est an sit propositio illa cui subordinatur
vocalis, sed an debeat dici propositio" (Ibid., f. 16va). "Sed quod noticia iudicativa debeat
dici propositio, licet non illa cui subordinatur propositio vocalis, non magna est vis: potest
enim propositio appellari postquam vera vel falsa dicitur" (Ibid., f. 16vb).
18 See G. Nuchelmans, op. cit., p. 94-98,
19 See E. J. Ashworth, "Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions", p. 79-80.
20 According to Ashworth, this is Peter of Ailly's view (E. J. Ashworth, "Mental
Language and the Unity of Propositions", p. 78).
21 "Secunda instantia est: si propositio mentalis esset única noticia sequeretur quod
non esset noticia complexa quod est falsum, quia tune non deberet dici oratio, ymo unus
terminus simplex, quod est falsum. Consequentia lamen probatur, quia si sit única noticia
non videtur quare debeat magis dici complexa quam noticia cui subordinatur iste terminus
'homo'. Ad hoc solet communiter dici quod non vocatur complexa in genere rei (sen
And this is the kind of complexity that corresponds to a proposition:
a complexity consisting of knowing an object in a way that it is not
known through an incomplex cognition which is presupposed by it as a
cognition of the same object22.
Two importan! aspeéis are involved in this definition: first, that the truc
relation between the mental proposition and the simple cognitions corre-
sponding to subject and predícate is not a relation of part-whole, but
a relation of presupposition. Pardo emphasises that this presupposition
should be as a cognition, thus ruling out some apparent counterexamples,
In the fírst place, it is not a matter of just presupposing a simple cognition,
as any intellective (human) cognition presupposes some sensitive cognition,
not necessarily being for this reason a complex cognition23. In the second
place, it is not a matter of presupposing a simple cognition as an object
(sub ratione obiecti), as the cognition through which some other cognition
is known presupposes the existence of this other cognition, though not its
being a cognition, and for this reason it should not be called a complex
cognition: for example, I can know the cognition that I have of Peter, but
this cognition is not known inasmuch as I am knowing Peter through it. In
contras!, a complex cognition presupposes the incomplex one inasmuch as
some object is being known by it, exactly the same object that is known by
the complex cognition: should the incomplex cognition not represent the
object, the complex cognition would not be able to represent it24.
formaliter aut intrinsece), eo quod sit plures noticie alterius rationis, sed solum in genere
signi, pro quanto equivale! in significando pluribus vocibus vel pluribus noticiis. Sed
contra, quia tune sequeretur quod esset aliqua propositio mentalis que non esset complexa.
Patet: capio mentalem cui subordinatur ista vocalis 'Sortes est Sortes'. Illa non est com-
plexa in genere signi, quod probo: quia non equivale! pluribus noticiis in significando,
nam per eam tantum cognoscitur id quod cognoscitur per noticiam cui subordinatur ille
terminus 'Sortes', sed aliter (puta, unitive)" (Medalla Dyaleclices, f. 16vb).
22 "Alia est ergo assignanda ratio quare dicatur complexa, si omnis propositio menta-
lis complexa debeat dici talis: quandocunque aliqua noticia aliqualiter cognoscitur circa
aliquod obiectum qualiter non cognoscitur per noticiam incomplexam quam presupponit
tanquam noticiam eiusdem obiecti, tune talis noticia debet dici complexa, quia milla noti-
cia incomplexa presupponit aliam noticiam incomplexam ut noticia est." (Ibid., f. 16vb).
Ashworth considers this idea of complexity to be an original contribution of Pardo
(E. J. Ashworth, "Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions", p. 79).
23 "Ñeque satis est ad noticiam complexam quod presupponit incomplexam, quia tune
noticia intellectiva que haberetur de aliquo sensibili semper deberet dici complexa, cum
presupponat noticiam sensitivam eiusdem obiecti; sed hoc non est quantum est ex parte
ipsius noticie, sed ex ordine potentiarum pro statu isto, qui non ex natura rei sed ex
ordinatione divina in anima coniuncta (saltem post peccatum primi hominis)" (Medalla
Dyalectices, f. 16vb).
24 "Etiam, non satis est ad noticiam complexam quod presupponat aliam noticiam sub
ratione obiecti, quia noticia per quam aliquis cognosceret intuitive noticiam exigit existen-
tiam illius noticie quam cognoscit, sed propterea non dicenda est complexa, quia non
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On the other hand, Pardo reminds us that in order to have a complex
cognition it is not sufficient to have this relation of presupposition, but
it is also needed that the same objects are known in a different way.
This idea is explained when considering the question whether a common
cognition (which seems to presuppose a singular cognition as a cognition)
should be called a complex one. Pardo's answer is that, although the com-
mon cognition presupposes a singular cognition of some object also known
by it, the object is not known in different ways. This solution might appear
an ad hoc one, as Pardo has to admit that the knowing con/use (corre-
sponding to the common cognition) and the knowing distincte (correspond-
ing to the singular cognition) do not count as different ways of knowing,
because confusión and distinction are not on the part of the thing, but only
on the part of the cognition: one may ask whether this thesis is compatible
with Pardo's general statement that intellectm movetur a re25.
In any case, it is clear that Pardo's idea of complexity involves pre-
supposition of simple cognitions and also a different way of representing.
A corollary is that, under this perspective, any syncategorematic term
becomes a complex term, as through the mental syncategorern the same
object is known as it is known by the corresponding mental categorem,
but in a way that it is not known by it26,
exigit eam sub ralione noticie sed solum sub ratione obiecti. Non enim cognosco noticiam
qiiam babeo de Petro eo quod per noliciarn Petri cognoscitur Petrus, per noticiam autem
complexam Ídem obiectum cognoscitur quod per incomplexam, ita quod noticia illa que
dicitur complexa presupponit incomplexam ut tendentem ad idern obiectum ad quod tendit
ipsa complexa, ita quod noticia illa que dicitur complexa nunquam representare! obiectum
nisi quia noticia incomplexa representare! idem obiectum." (Ibid., f, 16vb)
25 "Et si dicas: noticia communis presupponit noticiam singularem, ut noticia com-
munis omnium entium presupponit noticiam alicuius singularis etiarn sub ratione noticie,
et lamen manifestum est quod non debet dici complexa. Respondeo: noticia illa communis
omnium entium est incomplexa, et difficile est de ea probare quod presupponat noticiam
alicuius singularis entis sub ratione noticie, ita quod per illam noticiam communem non
potest omne ens representan et cognosci nisi quia per noticiam singularem aliquod ens
singulare representatur. Posset enim dici quod illa causatur ab aliquo singulari ente (vel
saltem a specie intelligibili alicuius singularis entis), eo quod talis noticia communis
semper est abstractiva. Dato etiam quod illa noticia communis presupponeret noticiam
incomplexam alicuius singularis entis, non propterea dici debet complexa, quia, ut dictum
est, per noticiam complexam idem obiectum cognoscitur quod per incomplexam, sed ali-
qualiter qualiter non cognoscitur per incomplexam. Sed per noticiam illarn communem,
quamvis idem obiectum cognoscitur quod cognoscitur per incomplexam singularem, non
lamen alio modo cognoscitur quam per incomplexam (saltem attendendo illum modum
quantum est ex parte obiecti cogniti), quamvis enim per unam noticiam cognoscatur tale
singulare confuse et per aliara distincte, illa lamen confusio et distinctio non se tenent ex
parte rei cognite, sed tantum ex parte cognitionis" (Ibid., f. 17ra).
26 "Ex isto patet quod omnis terminus sincathegoreumaticus dicilur terminus com-
plexus, nam subordinatur in mente conceptui complexo quo idem obiectum cognoscitur
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Finally, Pardo elabórales his notion of presupposition in terms oí a causal
relationship: the reason why the complex cognition is said to presuppose
the simple cognitions is that it is caused by them in the course of a cognitive
process, For example, we have seen that through the mental proposition
"Sócrates est Sócrates" one knows Sócrates as he is affirmatively related
to himself. Pardo understands that the act of knowing Sócrates this way is
the result of a cognitive process that must start by knowing Sócrates in itself
(this is achieved through the mental term "Sócrates"). Then, by a mecha-
nism that Pardo does not explain, this first cognition of Sócrates comes
to cause a new one, the proposition through which one knows Sócrates
in a different way as cannot be known by the simple term "Sócrates"27.
This raises the additional question as to whether the simple cognitions
are sufficient causes for the complex one. Pardo's answer is that they are
not: one can well know Sócrates by the simple cognition "Sócrates",
without automatically knowing that Sócrates is Sócrates (that is, Sócrates
as affirmatively related to himself), and this shows that the complex cog-
nition "Sócrates est Sócrates" needs some extra cause, apart from the
simple cognition that is presupposed by it28. The fact is that the tensión
between puré nominalism and some disguised realism that Pardo meets
at the ontological level is reproduced at the cognitive level, as the com-
plex cognition that was supposed to make us know the same things as
the simple ones that are presupposed, in a sense makes us know some-
thing different from the simple ones, namely, a modus se habendi that in
a sense must be something different from the things that are so related29.
quod per conceptum cui subordinatur cathegoreuma, sed aliqualiter qualiter non cogno-
scitur per noticiam cui subordinatur cathegoreuma (puta, universaliter, particulariter, aut
aliquo alio modo)" (Ibid., f, 17ra),
27 "Per hec patet quod noticia cui subordinatur ista vocalis 'Sortes est Sortes' est
complexa, eo quod causatur a noticia incomplexa et eam presupponit tanquam noticiam
eiusdem obiecti, et aliqualiter cognoscitur per islam noticiam (puta, relative unitive et
afñrmative) qualiter non cognoscitur per noticiam cui subordinatur iste terminus 'Sortes',
qui modus se habendi est Sortes realiter se habens" (Ibid., f. 17ra).
28 "Sed ibi esset bonum dubium: utrum noticia illius modi se habendi suffícienter
causetur a noticia rei que sic se habet. Respondeo: ad cognoscendum aliquem modum se
habendi necesse est habere noticias omnium eorum vel cuiuslibet quod exigitur ad talem
modum se habendi. Sed lamen hec consequentia non valet: 'cognosco quicquid exigitur ad
aliqua taliter se habere, ergo cognosco illa laliler se habere'; nam clarum esl quod ad hoc
quod Sones se habeal unitive affirmative ad seipsum non requiritur nisi Sortes, et lamen non
sequilur 'cognosco Sortem, ergo cognosco Sortem unitive in ordine ad seipsum', nam per
noticiam cui subordinatur iste terminus 'Sortem' cognosco Sortem et lamen non cognosco
Sortera unilive in ordine ad seipsum" (Ibid., f. 17ra).
29 "El ex hoc videtur apparentia quedam: quod ille modus se habendi unitive non
omnino ydemptificetur cura Sorte, ex eo quod stat aliquem cognoscere Sorlem el lamen
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Leaving aside this problem, the fact is that Pardo's idea of complexity
grants, as was desired, both the distinction between propositions and
terms and the unity of mental propositions. The worry now is what is left
in this picture of the traditional notions of subject and predicate,
The nature of mental predication
Pardo further elabórales his idea of mental complexity when he has to
face an objection concerning the possibility for a proposition of repre-
senting contradictory contents, along with the possibility of representing
the same things in repugnant ways30. Pardo is convinced that the "unity"
(that is, the simple nature) of a mental proposition does not prevent
it from being able to represent different (even contradictory) contents,
or to represent in different (even repugnant) ways. The key for a corred
understanding of the propositional unity is now a distinction between
absolute cognitions (noticia simplex seu absoluta) and comparativo ones
(noticia comparativa). An absolute cognition makes us know the thing
in itself, as not compared to anything, whereas a comparative cognition
makes us know the thing as related to something (in ordine ad aliud)31.
Pardo ascribes to the comparative cognitions the same notes previ-
ously ascribed to complex ones: a comparative cognition presupposes
the simple cognitions that are compared, in the sense that its representing
non cognoscit quod Sortes se habeat unitive in ordine ad seipsum. Et istud argumentum
posset applicari universaliter de ómnibus modis se habendi unius ad aliud, probando esse
aliquam distinctionem Ínter rem et modum se habendi, sed hoc omitto quia non est pre-
sentís inquisitionis" (¡bid., f. 17ra).
30 "Tertia instantia est: si propositio mentalis esset una simplex noticia sequeretur
quod eadem noticia esset noticia representativa contradictoriorum. Nam capiatur mentalis
cui subordinetur ista vocalis ypothetica 'Sortes currit et Sortes non currit': si illa sit única
simplex noticia, sequitur quod eadem noticia representa! contradictoria, scilicet Sortem
currere et Sortem non currere. Et universaliter sequeretur quod eadem noticia representare!
obiectum modis repugantibus (puta, intuitive, abstractive, singulariter, universaliter et sic
de alus modis). Si enim aliquis habeat mentalem cui subordinatur ista vocalis 'A est
albedo', pósito quod 'A' sit nomen proprium alicuius singularis albedinis quam intueatur,
tune per illam propositionem mentalem cognoscit A singulariter seu discrete, cognoscit
etiam ipsum A communiter seu confuse omnem albedinem cognoscendo; cognoscit etiam
A intuitive per illam noticiam, et abstractive per hoc quod cognoscit quamlibet albedinem
abstractive" (Ibid., f. 17ra-b). This problem has lead Peter of Ailly to consider hypothetical
propositions as composed, a view that also Andreas Limos has defended. See E. J. Ash-
worth, "Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions", p. 94.
31 "Respondeo: dúplex est noticia. Quedam est noticia simplex seu absoluta qua aliquod
cognoscitur absolute non relative in ordine ad aliud, alia est noticia comparativa qua aliquid
cognoscitur comparative seu relative in ordine ad aliud" (Medulla Dyalectices, f. 17rb).
See G. Nuchelmans, op, cít., p. 38.
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depends on the representing of the simple ones, and this dependence
is due to the fact that the comparative cognition musí be causea by the
simple cognitions that are presupposed32. Now Pardo adds a further note,
which casts much light on the kind of complexity that can be attributed
to mental propositions: the complex cognition is more perfect than the
simple cognitions that are its causes. This perfection is due to the fact
that the comparative cognition contains in a superior way (continet emi-
nentef)33 the ways of representing of the simple cognitions that have
caused it. This perfection is what explains the possibility of containing
different ways of representing, even repugnant or contradictory ones34.
If we apply this idea to mental propositions, we can see them as
comparative cognitions that are caused by some previous cognitions that
we can cali "subject" and "predicate". But, again, the relation between
a mental proposition and the cognitions corresponding to subject and
predicate is not one of part-whole, but a relation between two different
steps in the cognitive process. The way that subject and predicate are
"contained" in the proposition has to do with the relation between the
different kinds of representare that are involved in each step: after the
formation of a mental proposition, the initial way of representing is pre-
served in some sense but also transcended in a crucial sense.
Pardo allows himself to use the ñames "predicatio", "compositio"
and "divisio", but he is very careful not to interpret them in the sense that
a mental proposition is "composing" a subject with a predicate. Predi-
cating is not combining a predicate with a subject, but just representing
32 "Et hec secunda noticia comparativa presupponit noticiam simplicem vel noticias
simplices eius vel eorum que comparantur, nunquam enim intellectus potest comparare
aliquid in ordine ad aliud nisi cognoscat id quod comparatur, ita quod noticia illa que
dicitur comparativa dependet a noticia vel a noticiis eorum que comparantur, non solum
quo ad esse, sed etiam forte quo ad conservan. Per illam enim mentalem 'Sortes non est
Plato' cognosco Sortem in ordine ad Platonem, et illa noticia effective causatur a noticia
Sortis et Platonis, et sua representatio dependet a representationibus noticie Sortis et
noticie Platonis, ita quod noticia Sortis et noticia Platonis sunt tendentes seu represent-
antes sua obiecta, sine quibus tendentiis illa qualitas que est noticia comparativa non esset
cognitio Sortis in ordine ad Platonem" (Medulla Dyalectices, f. 17rb).
33 This view was defended by Peter of Brussels (E. J. Ashworth, "Mental Language
and the Unity of Propositions", p. 88).
34 "De illa autem noticia comparativa non est inconveniens quod represente! contra-
dictoria ñeque illis modis de quibus in argumento fit mentio, scilicet singulariter et uni-
versaliter intuitive et abstractive, et ratio huius est quia illa noticia est perfectior noticiis
illis a quibus causatur, ita quod continet eminenter modos illos representandi illarum
noticiarum a quibus causatur; qui modi, etsi circa unicam noticiam simplicem repugnan!,
non lamen circa noticiam comparativam, illa enim est ilumínala ad modos illos repre-
sentandi illarum noticiarum a quibus causatur" (Medulla Dyalectices, f. 17rb).
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some things in a special syncategorematic way. That is, through a mental
proposition we are signifying that something is something (or that it is
not): "significatur hoc esse hoc vel hoc non esse hoc"35. The compositiol
divisio is a new syncategorematic cognition caused by the previous ones,
but never composed of them. Pardo even claims that we can discover
this by introspective experience: it is true that, when understanding a
proposition, one experiences having a concept of the subject and a con-
cept of the predicate, but (Pardo says) one is not experiencíng them
as parts of the proposition; rather, what one experiences is that, once
these simple cognitions are formed, the intellect forms a new cognition,
namely a composition / división which is caused by the previous simple
concepts36.
Can we, then, legitimately speak of the subject and predicate of a
mental proposition? According to Pardo, we can say that a proposition
has a subject and a predicate in a derivative sense: in the sense that the
way of representing of the mental proposition is that of a predication.
That is, through a mental proposition something is known as it is attrib-
uted to something else (or to itself). The thing that is attributed in the
predication has the ratio of predicate, and the thing to which it is attrib-
uted has the ratio of subject. Thus derivatively, the propositional cogni-
tion through which I know, for example, that man is animal ("hominem
esse animal") can be said to have a subject, inasmuch as I am knowing
something (man) to which something else is attributed (animal), and it
can be said to have a predicate inasmuch as I am knowing something
(animal) that is attributed to something else (man), because this predica-
tive way of knowing contains in a superior way the cognitions of man
an animal37.
35 "Per hec dicta patet ad aliud quomodo dicantur in mente esse predicationes, pro
quanto per illas propositiones significatur hoc esse hoc vel hoc non esse hoc" (Ibid.,
f. 17vb).
36 "Ex his patet solutio ad persuasionem aliquorum tenentium propositionem mentalem
esse compositam ex pluribus noticiis. Sic enim persuaden!: experimur in nobis ut cum
audivimus illam vocalem 'Homo est animal' formamus unam noticiara de ly 'homo' et
aliam de ly 'animal', ergo dicendum est quod propositio mentalis est plures noticie,
Respondeo: non negandum est eis quin experiantur habere illos conceptus, cum de facto
ita sit, sed negó quod experiantur illos conceptus esse partes alienáis propositionis mentalis,
sed potius experiuntur oppositum. Experiuntur enim quod, habitis illis noticiis simplicibus,
intellectus componit, que compositio vera noticia est ab illis duabus caúsala. Querendum
enim esset ab istis experiantur ne illum actum sincathegoreumaticum quera ponunt copule
corre<spon>dentem, per quera actum nichil cognoscunt, quia non est noticia ut volunt.
Et si respondeant quod sic, credo quod dicant contra mentem" (Jbid., f. 17va-b).
37 "Sed ut amplius cognoscatur quo pacto noticia illa unitiva propositio mentalis
dicatur, ponitur quarta instantia: si talis propositio est una simplex noticia, sequitur quod
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Now, when it comes to explaining the logical properties that are tradi-
tionally explained in terms of subject-predicate relations (for example,
predicatio superioris de inferioré), Pardo always has recourse to the
cognitions that are the cause of the mental proposition. The cognitions
that we cali "subject" and "predicate" need not be there as real parts,
because they are contained in a superior way by the propositional cogni-
tion that transcends them (eminenter continet')38.
A striking corollary of Pardo's view is that the vocal propositions
"Homo est animal" and "Animal est homo" must be subordinated to
one and the same mental proposition. That is, to the objection that, in
the absence of any parts, the proposition that compares man and animal
cannot be distinguished from the proposition that compares animal and
man, Pardo concedes the argument: knowing man as related to animal
is exactly the same as knowing animal as related to man. This simply
confirms the non compositional character of any propositional act of
knowing. Through the mental proposition the intellect is just appre-
hending "at once" some individuáis as related to each other in a certain
way39.
non habet subiectum et predicatum; similiter, in ea non esset predicatio. Respondeo: in
ea dicitur esse predicatum et subiectum equivalenter et eminenter, pro quanto per eam
cognoscitur aliquid ut alteri attribuitur vel sibi ipsi, et sic id quod attribuitur habet rationem
predicati (saltera obiective) et id cui attribuitur dicitur habere rationem subiecti (saltem
obiective). Exemplum: illa noticia unitiva per quam cognosco hominem esse animal dici-
tur habere subiectum, pro quanto cognoscitur homo cui aliquid attribuitur, scilicet animal,
et illa noticia dicitur habere predicatum, pro quanto per eam cognoscitur animal quod
homini attribuitur cognoscendo quod homo est animal. Et ita homo dicitur subiectum
obiective et animal predicatum, et ita illi dúo termini 'homo' et 'animal' equivalenter
dicuntur subiectum et predicatum, pro quanto illa noticia eminenter continet noticiam
hominis et noticiam animalis" (Ibid., f. 17vb).
38 "Qualiter autem una predicatio dicatur superioris de inferiori videndum est, consi-
derando si illa noticia unitiva causetur ex duabus noticiis quarum una sit superioris et
altera inferioris, et ita in alus noticiis consimiliter est iudicandum" (Ibid., f. 17vb).
39 "Et si arguas: non est aliqua ratio quare homo habeat magis rationem subiecti
quam animal, cum per illa cognoscatur hominem esse animal et animal esse hominem,
qui enim compara! animal ad hominem etiam compara! hominem ad animal. Respondeo:
argumentum vincit quod tara homo quam animal possunt habere rationem subiecti et
predicati, homo enim potest habere rationem subiecti pro quanto animal cognoscitur
in ordine ad hominem, potest etiam habere rationem predicati pro quanto cognoscitur
in ordine ad animal, et similiter dico de ly 'animal' quod potest habere rationem subiecti
et predicati. Ideo, concedo quod ille due propositiones vocales 'Homo est animal'
'Animal est homo' eidem mentali subordinantur, et certe in vocali quilibet illorum
terminorum posset dici indifferenter subiectum vel predicatum, nisi consuetum esset
terminum precedentem copulara appellare subiectum et alium terminum predicatum"
(Ibid., í. 17vb).
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Mental propositions and "mental copula"
Finally, we can understand the completely new conception of the
copula that is involved in Pardo's account. As we have seen, the role
of the propositional cognition is not that of combining subject and pred-
ícate into a composite unit, but rather that of representing them in a new
predicative way. In accordance with this view, Pardo explains that the
Aristotelian dictum according to which the copula "est" makes a com-
position of predícate with subject should be understood in the sense that
the copula signifies in a compositive way the things that are absolutely
signified by subject and predicate40.
In Pardo's position, the vocal "est" is not subordinated to any part of
the predicative cognition (as there are no parts in it), but to the whole
mental proposition that represents aliqua aliqualiter. In what sense, then,
can we speak of a "mental copula" according to Pardo's position? The
only "mental copula" that is admissible in this account is the mental
proposition itself, as it is the only cognition to which the vocal "est" can
be subordinated41,
Again, certain prejudices about "subject" and "predicate" come to
distort our visión, We seem to have the intuitive idea that the syncate-
gorematic cognition corresponding to the copula needs to be accompanied
by the categorematic cognitions corresponding to subject and predicate
(thus apparently confirming the view of a mental proposition as a com-
posite of several parts). Of course, Pardo agrees that a "way of being
related" cannot be known unless the things that are so related are also
known: in some sense, there is a dependence between the propositional
cognition and some simple cognitions of what we cali its "extremes".
But Pardo's conception of syncategorems allows the mental proposition
to represen! both the things related and the way of being related: that is,
40 "Quapropter bene dicit Aristóteles primo Periarmenias: si ly 'est' purum dixeris
(hoc est, solitarie acceperis), nichil significa!, sed significa! quandam compositionem
extremorum, id est, iunctum extremis significa! id quod extrema significan! aliqualiler
(pula, unitive et compositive) qualiter extrema non significan! (scilicet, compositive et
unitive sen complexive), quod certe sine extremis non est intelligere illud scilicet quod est
compositio. Vult ergo habere Aristóteles quod ly 'est' in voce vel scripto exprimit illam
noticiam que compositio dicitur, ideo dictum illud commune quod illa copula 'est' denolal
unionem predicali cum subiecto falsum est secundum sensum formalem quem habet, nisi
caperentur 'subiectum' et 'predicatum' obiective pro rebus ipsis vel pro re ipsa signifícala
vel significatis per subiectum et predicatum. Litellectus ergo illius propositionis est iste:
quod ly <'est'> significat ea que per subieclum el predicatum significantur unitive" (Ibid.,
f. 12vb).
41 Ashworth atlributes this view to Andreas de Novo Castro (E. 3. Ashworth, "Menlal
Language and Ihe Unily of Proposilions", p. 86).
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the dependence does not mean that the syncategorematic cognition is not
sufficient by itself to represen! aliquid aliqualiter. This dependence has
been explained, not in térras of a part-whole relation, but in terms of a
relation of causation and eminenter confiriere. So, once it has been caused
by the categorematic cognitions, the syncategorematic cognition (on its
own) suffices to represen! both the things compared and their way of
being related42.
An interesting feature of this "holistic" view is that this allows Pardo
to interpret negative propositions as a mental división (instead of as
the negation of a mental composition). The vocal expression "non est"
is subordinated to a single (propositional) cognition, the one through
which something is known as related to something else in a comparativo
negative way43.
So far we have at least two different copulas, affirmative and negative.
But, as can be expected, Pardo's picture gets more intricate as the struc-
ture of propositions becomes more complex. Pardo takes, for example,
the universal affirmative proposition "Omnis homo est animal" and
the universal negative "Nullus homo est animal". According to him,
the mental copula corresponding to the proposition "Omnis homo est
animal" is a comparative cognition that signifies that animal is attributed
to every man, and the mental copula corresponding to the proposition
42 "Respondeo: diclum esl in solulione precedenli noticiam comparalivam dependeré
a noticia simplici, puta a noticiis extremorum. Quamobrem apparenter posse dici proposi-
tionem mentalem esse plures noticias, diceretur enim quod illa mentalis 'Homo est animal'
non esl precise noticia illa unitiva cui subordinalur ly 'est', sed etiam est tres noticie [...].
Et si obiiceretur quod illa noticia unitiva est sufficiens ut per eam cognoscantur ita esse
vel non esse, ergo illa noticia debet dici propositio menlalis. Responderelur quod illa
noticia non esl sufficiens ad represenlandum hominem esse animal, quia si per impossibile
removerenlur ille noticie simplices et remanerel illa qualitas que modo est noticia com-
parativa seu unitiva, illa qualitas non amplius essel noticia nec per eam aliquid cogno-
scerelur. [...] Ideo, dico ad rationem concedendo quod noticia illa unitiva cui subordinatur
ly 'esl' esl propositio mentalis. Quod enim adducitur qualitatem que modo est noticia
unitiva non significare hominem et animal unitive seclusis noticiis simplicibus extremorum
(lenenli quod Deus potest faceré: non stalim manifesle probarelur conlrarium, quicquid
lamen sil), hoc non aufert ab ea esse propositionem, representa! enim taliter qualiter suff-
icil ad propositionem, nam non requiritur ad esse propositionem quod secluso quocunque
alio represente!" (Medalla Dyalectices, f. 18ra-b).
43 "El istud diclum inlelligitur de propositione mentali que est compositio, quia de
propositione menlali que est divisio aliud est, non enim ly 'es!' in voce subordinalur men-
tali negative sed aggregatum ex ly 'est' et negatione negante ly 'est' subordinatur mentali
negative. Ut si dicam 'Homo non est animal', tolum hoc 'non est' subordinatur noticie per
quam unitive negative cognosco hominem et animal" (Ibid., f. 18rb). Ashworth describes
this opion as defended by William Heytesbury (E. J. Ashworth, "Mental Language and
the Unity of Propositions", p. 89).
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"Nullus homo est animal" is a negative cognition that signifies that ani-
mal is attributed to no man. Pardo explains that the vocal quantifier is
not subordinated to a specific cognition, but both the "omnis" and the
"est" (and similarly the "nullus" and the "est") are subordinated to one
and the same cognition (namely, to the propositional cognition that we
can cali "mental copula", as it is the cognition to which the vocal copula
is subordinated)44. This means that we see in Pardo a proliferation of
"mental copulas": we have as many copulas as different ways of appre-
hending ita esse vel non esse.
Conclusión
Pardo has presented a consisten! view about the simplicity of mental
propositions (and of mental acts in general)45. He has managed to free
himself from the "common sense prejudices" that usually lead us to
postúlate a structure of mental language as mirroring the obvious struc-
ture of vocal and written language. We have seen that mental language
is composed of simple acts of knowing. At most, what mirrors the struc-
ture of vocal and written language is rather the step by step cognitive
process that ends up in a given propositional cognition.
In other words, speaking about a "structure" of mental propositions
only makes sense in a "genealogical" way. Pardo replaces the question
about parts with a new question about the "causal history" of any mental
act. What is complex is the cognitive process that has led to a cognition,
not the propositional cognition itself. In his logical work, Pardo does not
describe this psychological process, but it is clearly presupposed. (In its
turn, the structure of the psychological process is reflecting a real struc-
ture: the relations among particulars that Pardo has added to his initially
Buridanian ontology.)
But there is a further step that Pardo takes and that weakens the cred-
ibility of his proposal. He has had the courage to defend a view against
44 "Credo lamen quod dicendo 'Omnis homo esl animal' ly 'omnis' non habeat pro-
priam subordinationem distinctam a ly 'est', sed ly 'omnis' et ly 'est' subordinantur noticie
unitive universali per quam unitive cognoscitur animal disiunctim seu confuse tantum in
ordine ad hominem universaliter seu copulative. Unde quando signum determina! proposi-
tionem quemadmodum dicendo 'Omnis homo est animal', ly 'omnis' non subordinatur
noticie qua precise cognoscitur homo, sed subordinatur cum ly 'est' toti propositioni uni-
versali" (Medalla Dyalectices, f, 18va-b).
43 See, however, Ashworth's criticism (E. J. Ashworth, "Mental Language and the
Unity of Propositions", p. 87-88).
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certain "common sense" that is biased by our familiarity with vocal and
written pieces of language. But this biased common sense seems to reap-
pear in a way that (in my opinión) spoils his innovative conception of
mental language. As we have seen, driven by the idea of subordination
of vocal to mental language, he is forced to admit that the vocal "est" is
a proposition in its own right, because, being subordinated to the mental
"est", it signifies in the way required for being a proposition46.
But as a consequence, Pardo seems also forced to admit that the com-
plex vocal expression "Homo est animal" is not a proposition in the strict
sense, but an aggregate of a proposition (the copula) plus the terms that
signify what things are being signified by it47. In analogy to what happens
at the mental level, the reason that we can say that vocal subject and
predicate are parts of the vocal proposition is that they signify separately
what the "est" is signifying in a comparative way48. And, as the cogni-
tions that we cali "subject" and "predicate" must be presupposed in order
to have the simple cognition that is the mental proposition, so the vocal
subject and predicate must be added to the vocal proposition ("est") in
order for it to signify the aliquid that it aliqualiter signifies. For example,
"homo" and "animal" have to appear in the vocal expression "Homo est
animal", but their role is just that of signifying in an absolute way the
things that the copula is by itself signifying in a comparative way49.
46 "Concedo preterea unum quod parum aspicientibus videbitur alienum: quia ly 'est'
in voce est tota propositio, quia sufficienter significa! illud quod requiritur ad esse propo-
sitionem" (Medulla Dyalectices, f. 18rb).
47 "Et si dicas nonne debet concedí quod totum hoc 'Homo est animal' est propositio,
dico quod non, sicut ñeque debet concedí de aggregato ex noticia unitiva et de illis noticiis
simplicibus quod debeat dici propositio. Et ideo, si ille due voces 'homo' 'animal' dicantur
subiectum et predicatum hoc est in isto sensu, id est, signifícant ea que unitive cognoscuntur
unum in ordine ad aliud per conceptus correspondentes. (Alias tamen loquendo utar hoc
toto 'Homo est animal' et similibus pro ipsa propositione dum argumentum non petet illam
difficultatem.) Et sicut ille noticie correspondentes extremis non sunt partes propositionis
mentalis, sic etiam ille voces 'homo' 'animal' non sunt partes propositionis vocalis, ideo
consimiliter applicatur de propositione vocali sicut applicatur de rnentali" (Ibid., f. 18rb).
48 "Et si dicas: ly 'homo' ponitur in propositione, respondeo: ille conceptus cui sub-
ordinatur ille terminus 'homo' causaliter dicitur poni in propositione, pro quanto effective
causal conceptum illum unitivum qui propositio est. Et isla vox dicitur poni in proposi-
tione quia instrumentaliter movet ad formandum conceptum qui propositio est saltem
medíate, nam immediate excitat ad formandum conceptum sui significati, qui conceptus
causal illum qui propositio dicitur. Ule etiam due voces 'homo' et 'animal' dicuntur partes
istius vocalis 'Homo est animal' quia signifícant seorsum ea que conceptus unitivus pro-
positonalis unitive significa!" (Ibid., f. 18vb).
49 "Et si queras: si ly 'est' est propositio, quid ergo opus est in voce ly 'homo' et ly
'animal'. Respondeo: ly 'homo' et ly 'animal' ponuntur ad significandum ea que ly 'est'
unitive debe! significare" (Ibid., f. 18rb).
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This is, I think, the weakest point in Pardo's proposal. He could have
explained otherwise the composition that is obvious at the vocal level.
Why not just say that the whole composite expression "Homo est animal"
is as a whole subordinated to the mental syncategorematic act that we can
cali either copula or mental proposition? This would not compromise the
simplicity of mental propositions, as Pardo has explained that mental
propositions contain not as parts, but in a superior way, all the cognitions
that are presupposed as their causes. This eminenter continere would be
harmlessly reflected in the compositional character of vocal and written
propositions.
